Moroccan foreign fighters: evolution of a phenomenon, promotive factors, and the limits of hardline policies by Masbah, Mohammed
www.ssoar.info
Moroccan foreign fighters: evolution of a
phenomenon, promotive factors, and the limits of
hardline policies
Masbah, Mohammed
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Stellungnahme / comment
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Masbah, M. (2015). Moroccan foreign fighters: evolution of a phenomenon, promotive factors, and the limits of
hardline policies. (SWP Comment, 46/2015). Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik -SWP- Deutsches Institut für
Internationale Politik und Sicherheit. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-454908
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
  Mohammed Masbah is a former fellow in the project “Elite change and new social mobilization in the Arab world”  SWP Comments 46 
 realized by the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). The project is funded by the German Foreign Office in the framework of  October 2015 
 the transformation partnerships with the Arab World and the Robert Bosch Stiftung. It cooperates with the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung  
 and the Ph.D. grant programs of the Heinrich Böll Stiftung and the Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung. 
1 
Stiftung  
Wissenschaft und 
Politik 
German Institute  
for International and 
Security Affairs  
SW
P
 C
om
m
en
ts
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Moroccan Foreign Fighters 
Evolution of the Phenomenon, Promotive Factors, and the Limits of Hardline Policies 
Mohammed Masbah 
With a contingent of around 1,500 fighters, Morocco is considered one of the main 
exporters of foreign fighters to Syria. Until 2014, Moroccan authorities, who were con-
tent to see their own jihadis leave and add to the pressure on Bashar al-Assad, mostly 
turned a blind eye to networks of recruitment. Since the dramatic rise of the so-called 
Islamic State, or ISIS, concern over local repercussions and the return of war-hardened 
radicals has prompted Rabat to adopt a hardline, security-oriented approach instead. 
Repression, however, is unlikely to uproot these networks. Instead, a comprehensive 
strategy for de-radicalization should aim to rehabilitate and reintegrate returning 
fighters, and use their example to dissuade others from violent militancy. 
 
The phenomenon of Moroccan fighters 
joining militant jihadi groups abroad is 
not new. During the 1980s, dozens of Mo-
roccans from different Islamic ideological 
backgrounds traveled to Afghanistan to 
participate in the insurgency against the 
Soviet domination of that country. When 
the Taliban came to power in 1996, an 
organization called Groupe Islamique Com-
battant Marocain was formed to represent 
former fighters of Moroccan origin who 
had settled in Afghanistan, but also to plan 
for attacks in Morocco at a later stage. Yet, 
the lack of strategy and leadership left 
this group an empty shell. After 2003, the 
American invasion of Iraq helped bring a 
new generation of foreign fighters to the 
fore. Moroccan authorities quickly tightened 
their grip on those who intended to join 
Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi’s al-Qaeda in Iraq 
(AQI) and prevented hundreds from join-
ing this new theater of war. Nevertheless, 
around 200–300 Moroccans managed to 
join the fight in Iraq, most of whom ended 
up killed or jailed there. According to 
records of al-Qaeda’s internal organization 
captured by the US army in the Iraqi town 
of Sinjar in the fall of 2007, Moroccans con-
stituted at least 6 percent (36 individuals) 
of a total of 700 foreign fighters with AQI. 
The Syrian revolution as a trigger 
Since early 2012, the militarization of the 
Syrian and Libyan revolutions has shifted 
the phenomenon of foreign fighters to new 
arenas. Recruitment of Moroccan foreign 
fighters increased and reached its peak 
between June and December 2013. During 
that period of six months, more than 900 
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joined the fight in Syria – an average of 
around 150 fighters per month. According 
to Moroccan security officials, the estimat-
ed overall number reached 1,122 fighters in 
June 2014, and 1,350 by July 2015, of which 
at least 254 had died in the fighting. If 
Europeans of Moroccan origin are included, 
the number increases to somewhere 
between 2,000 and 2,500 fighters in total. 
After Syria, Libya has become the second 
most important destination for Moroccan 
jihadis. Reportedly, some 300 Moroccan 
fighters have followed the call by ISIS leader 
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi for North Africans to 
join the group’s self-proclaimed Emirate in 
Libya. Even more have been using Libya as 
a passageway to Syria to avoid heightened 
security monitoring of the “traditional” 
route through Turkey. 
The second generation of jihadis 
Recruits to the fight in Syria do not form a 
monolithic group. Most are recent converts 
from either non-religious or non-violent 
Islamic background to the jihadist line of 
Salafism (which promotes militant struggle 
to restore Islam to the alleged purity of its 
early forms), with only loose ideological 
commitment to the jihadi ideology. Accord-
ing to official Moroccan statistics, 88 per-
cent have no prior criminal records. How-
ever, in the training camps in Syria and 
Libya, these recruits are converted into 
hardened jihadis through a process of sys-
tematic indoctrination. This includes theo-
logical instruction that is based on tawhid 
(the oneness of God) and condemns non-
religious forms of rule and existing nation 
states as symbols of Western domination. 
It promotes instead the model of ISIS: the 
resurrection of the Caliphate to be estab-
lished through militant struggle (jihad). 
Training on weapons and for actual combat 
is introduced gradually according to sen-
iority in the organization. 
Indeed, the involvement in the military 
conflicts in Syria and Libya has already led 
to the emergence of a new generation of 
Moroccan jihadis, whose extremist views – 
for example, justifying the burning alive 
and decapitation of prisoners practiced 
by ISIS – make traditional Salafi leaders in 
Morocco fear that they are “corrupting” the 
very concept of jihad. Yet, how large the 
proportion of this ultra-radical generation 
is within the ranks of Moroccan foreign 
fighters in Syria is difficult to ascertain. 
Recruitment process 
In general, recruitment is mainly based on 
personal relations. Yet, social media has 
become a new channel of recruitment, and 
– according to a local Moroccan NGO – 
around 60 percent of Moroccans who joined 
the fighting in Syria are today recruited 
via social networks, whereas the rest are 
recruited face-to-face. 
There are also notable differences in the 
degree to which new recruits have control 
over the process of their affiliation with the 
armed struggle, including even the decision 
as to which group they will join. In general, 
those with a certain level of education, access 
to media, and experience in international 
travel are better positioned to manage their 
own journeys and avoid police monitoring. 
Others travel in small groups of ex-prisoners 
or friends at work and rely on logistic and 
sometimes financial support from trans-
national terrorist networks, which in turn 
steer them toward specific groups and 
areas. There are numerous reports of friends 
who, after leaving Morocco together, found 
themselves in different groups, and some-
times ended up fighting each other. 
Push and pull factors 
To understand why so many Moroccans 
join the Syrian battlefield, it is important 
to highlight the interrelated push and pull 
factors that account for the influx of fight-
ers from Morocco to Syria and Libya: they 
are of a political, logistical, sociological, 
and ideological nature. 
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Political factors 
Up to 2013, the inaction bordering on tacit 
encouragement displayed by the Moroccan 
authorities constituted an important push 
factor that facilitated the travel of jihadis. 
This policy was clearly driven by the desire 
to get rid of them and reduce the burden of 
controlling and containing the local Salafi-
jihadi scene, within as well as outside the 
prison system. In addition, Morocco was a 
member country in the Group of Friends 
of the Syrian People and hosted its fourth 
meeting in Marrakech in December 2012, 
where the Syrian National Coalition was 
recognized as the legitimate representative 
of the Syrian people. In jihadi milieus, 
this position was interpreted as an official 
endorsement of the Syrian opposition to 
the Assad regime, and hence implicitly 
legitimized armed struggle against it. 
Unlike other countries of the region, 
such as Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt, in 
Morocco the events of 2011 did not lead 
to a security vacuum that would have 
weakened the central government, leading 
to areas without state control. Rather, 
Morocco has maintained an effective border 
management system and cooperates with 
the EU on this account. It has also modern-
ized its security sector to be more profes-
sional and effective. Nevertheless, hundreds 
of jihadis succeeded in reaching Syria in 
2013 virtually unimpeded. That year, only 
five cells that exported jihadis to Syria were 
dismantled, whereas the number grew 
subsequently to at least 27 cells being dis-
mantled by May 2015. The authorities also 
issued passports to notorious jihadis and 
allowed them to leave the country. The 
cases of Anass Haloui, the spokesman of 
former jihadi detainees, and Fatiha Hassani, 
the widow of the al-Qaeda leader Karim 
Mejjati (killed in Saudi Arabia in April 2005) 
are prominent examples. Despite their 
records and close monitoring by security 
services, both traveled unchallenged 
through Casablanca airport to Syria. 
This laxity of the authorities stands in 
stark contrast to their firm reactions on 
earlier occasions, when the same phenom-
enon ran counter to – rather than support-
ing – Morocco’s policy choices: between 
2003 and 2007, Moroccan authorities cracked 
down on those who intended to travel 
to Iraq to fight the American occupation 
forces or join al-Qaeda, and succeeded in 
dismantling more than 30 cells active 
in recruiting young Moroccans to Iraq. 
Logistical factors 
The second pull-factor is logistical. Surpris-
ingly, traveling to Syria appears to be rela-
tively safe, easy, and cheap. The cost of a 
trip does not exceed US$1,000 and is funded 
either by the fighter himself or the recruiter. 
So far, most Moroccans have joined the 
fight in Syria through the “traditional” 
route: a regular airline flight from Casa-
blanca airport to Istanbul, then onwards 
by bus to Gaziantep in southern Turkey, 
or Jarablus, which is just across the Syrian 
border. It worth mentioning here that 
Moroccans do not need a visa to travel to 
Turkey and Tunisia. When the authorities 
tightened their control on Casablanca air-
port and closely screened travelers, jihadis 
who looked for alternative routes chose 
stopovers in Tunisia by flight or made their 
way informally through Algerian territory 
into Libya, before traveling on to Syria. 
Sociological factors 
There is a clear correlation between the 
recruitment of foreign fighters and social 
marginalization. According to a study 
released in November 2014 by the Observa-
toire du Nord des droits de l’homme (a local 
Moroccan NGO) on fighters stemming from 
the northern cities of Morocco, two-thirds 
were under the age of 25, and three-quar-
ters belonged to deprived strata that live in 
the slums of big and medium-sized cities 
such as Casablanca, Salé (the significantly 
poorer sister city of the capital Rabat), and 
Tangier, a milieu which already generated 
the type of radicalism that led to the Casa-
blanca bombings of 2003. Less than one-
quarter qualify as middle class. 
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Cities in the northwest of Morocco 
export more fighters than other cities. 
For example, by 2014 the town of Fnideq 
(70,000 inhabitants) had exported around 
200 fighters to Syria, which is around 13 
percent of the total number of Moroccan 
foreign fighters. According to statistics 
provided by the Directorate General of 
National Security, the two northern cities 
of Tangier and Tetouan (with a combined 
population of around 1.5 million) contrib-
ute around 30 percent of Moroccan jihadis 
traveling to Syria – roughly the same share 
as the country’s two biggest cities, Casa-
blanca and Fes, which together have three 
times the population. 
Among the major reasons for this preva-
lence of foreign fighters stemming from 
the northwestern cities is the massive and 
largely uncontrolled process of urbaniza-
tion that occurred in these areas during 
the last decades, resulting in, among other 
factors, a high level of youth unemploy-
ment. Although unemployment, in particu-
lar of youth, is also rampant in the slums 
of Casablanca, the north also suffers from 
a traditional parallel economy fed by drug 
cultivation. On the one hand, the launder-
ing of drug money has resulted in an arti-
ficially inflated demand for real estate, 
which in turn drives up the cost of living 
for local communities. Poverty and the lack 
of alternatives, on the other hand, have 
pushed youths into informal or illicit activ-
ities, such as street vending and smuggling. 
For quite a few, traveling to Syria is just an-
other option to escape a social reality that 
offers limited prospects for a decent living, 
and constitutes an almost seamless tran-
sition from one type of illicit activity to 
another. 
Moreover, their prior involvement in il-
legal activities facilitates contact to seasoned 
smugglers based in the two Spanish-con-
trolled cities of Ceuta and Melilla, 50 percent 
of whose population is of Muslim-Moroccan 
origin. Although formally Spanish citizens, 
these people are marginalized in compari-
son to Christian-Spanish residents. This has 
helped to create networks of illicit activity 
that are similar to – and cooperate with – 
those in Morocco. It has also fueled senti-
ments of exclusion that facilitate jihadist 
propaganda. As a result, Ceuta and Melilla 
alone accounted for around 70 percent 
of the Spanish jihadis arrested in Spain 
between 2013 and mid-2015. For instance, 
El Príncipe, a poor quarter of Ceuta, is a 
hotspot for the recruitment of jihadist 
groups and a refuge for drug traffickers 
alike. Thus, the two types of illegal net-
works overlap and sustain each other, 
allowing jihadis to communicate and co-
ordinate their efforts to evade the control 
of both Moroccan and Spanish authorities. 
Ideological factors 
Although all of these factors have been 
in place for a while, the conflict in Syria 
created a new boost to jihadi ideology, 
which had been in decline after a number 
of prominent radicals of the prior decade 
had reversed their positions. In Morocco, 
local sheikhs started to echo fatwas (binding 
legal opinions) of global jihadis against the 
Assad regime and vociferously called for 
the support of “Sunnis” in Syria. 
Jihadis have built the rhetoric support-
ing their recruitment on both religious and 
non-religious arguments. According to the 
former, Syria constitutes the place where 
the final battle between believers and non-
believers will take place, bringing about the 
end of time. They have also emphasized the 
Assad regimes’ crimes against the Syrian 
people, and Arab and Western failure to 
prevent or contain them. Through this dis-
course, Moroccan jihadis have succeeded 
in appealing to disaffected youth, many of 
whom had already been deeply affected 
by images of the brutal assault on Syrians 
circulated through social media and trans-
national satellite TV stations such as Al 
Jazeera. 
The process accelerated after a confer-
ence in Cairo was organized by several orga-
nizations of Sunni scholars in June 2013, 
during which time a fatwa was issued that 
called for Muslims all over the world to 
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support the Syrian people by “all means”. 
This fatwa boosted recruitment further and 
legitimized the phenomenon of foreign 
fighters in Syria. Recruiters have also been 
able to draw upon local Salafi structures, 
in particular in the northwest, which had 
been built in a decentralized fashion, and 
hence survived the security crackdowns con-
ducted by the Moroccan authorities, in par-
ticular in the wake of the 2003 Casablanca 
attacks. Finally, some members of the 
younger generation turned away from their 
ideological forebearers, judging them to 
be too soft and not committed to the fight. 
Still, many Moroccans joined the fight-
ing in Syria for reasons that are less related 
to ideology than to their frustrations with 
the corrupt and semi-authoritarian environ-
ment they endure in their own country, 
which leaves little room for the active po-
litical role they aspire to. The case of Abdel 
Aziz El Mehdali (aka Abu Usama al-Maghribi) 
is a good example. Born in 1986, El Mehdali 
worked as a street vendor in the city of 
Tetouan, struggling daily with local author-
ities and police who extracted bribes in 
exchange for tolerating his activities. Before 
joining the fighting in Syria, he partici-
pated in the 2011 protests that demanded 
substantial political and social reforms and 
was active in defending Islamist detainees. 
Once he joined the jihad in Syria, he became 
a hero in the eyes of the youth of his city, 
inspiring others to follow his example. 
The road to ISIS 
Moroccan fighters joined several armed 
groups in Syria, with a number of them 
changing their loyalties in the course of the 
conflict, adding to the difficulty of classi-
fying them accurately. Generally speaking, 
the most prominent groups to attract 
them have been Jabhat al-Nusra (the official 
Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate), ISIS and Harakat 
Sham al-Islam. The first wave of fighters 
joined Jabhat al-Nusra in early 2012 until 
mid-2013. Most of them had been fighters 
with AQI before, and their numbers were 
limited, reaching a few hundred by early 
2013. Moroccans fighting for Jabhat al-Nusra 
were known for suicide attacks on behalf 
of the group. 
Harakat Sham al-Islam 
By mid-2013, many of the Moroccans who 
originally joined the Nusra group defected 
to other groups. A new dynamic occurred 
among the Moroccan fighters in Syria when 
Brahim Benchekroun – a veteran Afghanis-
tan fighter and ex-Guantanamo detainee 
(2002–2004) – created Harakat Sham 
al-Islam. In 2005, Benchekroun had been 
transferred to Morocco, where he was im-
prisoned between 2005 and 2011. After his 
release, he left for Mauritania, where he 
joined the fighting in Syria. Known for his 
personal charisma, he succeeded in attract-
ing Moroccan Salafi fighters who, like him, 
had been detained in Moroccan prisons. 
The organization he established is a 
Salafi-jihadi group that claims organiza-
tional independence from – but embraces 
the ideology of – al-Qaida, and was desig-
nated a terrorist group by the US State 
Department in 2014. By the end of 2013, 
the new movement served as an umbrella 
for Moroccan foreign fighters in Syria, who, 
with some 500–700 fighters, formed a clear 
majority in the group. Yet, some non-Moroc-
cans were also part of its leadership, for 
example the head of its Sharia committee 
was a Saudi, and its military commander 
was an Egyptian. 
When fighting broke out between ISIS 
and other rebel groups in January 2014, 
Harakat Sham al-Islam kept neutral at first. 
It also rejected the US-led coalition against 
ISIS, but later criticized ISIS for its dictator-
ship and exclusion of other groups. At the 
same time, the group was involved in active 
combat against the Syrian regime and lost 
many fighters in clashes in Latakia, where 
it was based, during March and April 2014, 
including its leader, Benchekroun. 
Without its founder, the group was weak-
ened considerably. Although the Shura 
Council elected a new leader (a former sol-
dier in the Moroccan army by the name of 
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Mohammed Mehdi, alias: Abu Talha Mehdi 
Slaoui), the new leader lacks the charisma 
of his predecessor as well as a Salafi-jihadi 
ideological background. Hence, Harakat 
Sham al-Islam entered into an alliance with 
four other Islamist groups in the Latakia 
region in July 2014 to form the so-called 
Jabhat Ansar al-Din (The Front of the Sup-
porters of the Religion) to offset its losses. 
Yet, without Benchekroun, Harakat Sham 
al-Islam has lost much of its attraction. 
ISIS 
With the proclamation of the Caliphate in 
June 2014, and the establishment of the US-
led coalition against it in September that 
year, the attraction of ISIS received a con-
siderable boost. As a result, many Moroc-
cans from Harakat Sham al-Islam and other 
groups defected and joined ISIS. Today, ISIS 
is considered the first address for Moroccan 
fighters in Syria, and there is a growing 
tendency to pledge allegiance to its leader, 
al-Baghdadi, including among Salafi-jihadis 
still imprisoned in Morocco. 
The reasons for this support are threefold. 
First, the ultra-radical and trans-national 
ideology of ISIS is attractive in comparison 
to other groups, such as Jabhat al-Nusra, 
who are more Syrian-nationalist in orienta-
tion and more pragmatic in their tactics, 
including alliances with non-jihadi groups. 
Second, ISIS provides salaries (around 
US$400/month) and other incentives, such 
as houses and cars, and arranges marriages, 
sometimes with enslaved women, all of 
which attract youth to join its ranks. Thus, 
for many despairing youth who used to 
dream of immigration to Europe, Syria be-
came the “worldly paradise” that provides 
good opportunities for the underprivileged. 
Finally, the military achievements of ISIS – 
in particular the capture of Mosul and wide 
swathes of territory in Iraq throughout the 
summer of 2014 – enticed Moroccan as well 
as other foreign fighters to join the organi-
zation in droves. 
Nevertheless, most Moroccans fighting 
with ISIS are foot soldiers, and only a few of 
them have moved up to second-level ranks 
of the group. For instance, El Mehdali, 
who had left Morocco in 2012 and initially 
joined Jabhat al-Nusra, became a field com-
mander in Aleppo and its surroundings 
after defecting to ISIS by mid-2013. Ironi-
cally, he was killed, alongside 20 fighters, 
by Jabhat al-Nusra during clashes between 
the two groups in March 2014. 
According to Moroccan officials, there 
are at least three other Moroccans occupying 
high-ranking positions in ISIS, including 
the position as judge of the city of Mosul, 
the head of the communications depart-
ment, and the governor of the Turkmen 
mountains. Beyond that, there is no con-
clusive information about Moroccans 
achieving senior levels within ISIS. 
The government response: 
A hardline policy 
Since the rise of ISIS, the Moroccan author-
ities – growing more concerned about the 
return of Moroccan foreign fighters – have 
reversed their formerly lenient attitude 
toward Salafi-jihadis traveling to Syria. Pre-
ventive measures have included modifi-
cations to the 2003 anti-terrorism law to 
contain provisions that sanction Moroccans 
participating in combat outside the coun-
try as well as tightened controls at strategic 
locations such as airports and along the 
eastern and southeastern borders with Alge-
ria and Mauritania. Yet, the efforts to deal 
with the phenomenon have been inconsist-
ent and are hampered by the overemphasis 
on security approaches. 
The security approach 
Moroccan authorities have increasingly 
adopted a “zero tolerance” approach to 
jihadis, inside as well as outside the coun-
try. The Royal Armed Forces joined the US-
led coalition against ISIS in Iraq and Syria 
in September 2014. Its security services 
have been a source of valuable intelligence 
about transnational jihadi networks for 
several Western countries, especially Spain, 
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and later France. Both have recognized 
Moroccan efforts in terms of anti-terrorism 
cooperation. 
In addition, networks and cells for the 
recruitment of foreign fighters have been 
targeted out of concern that these struc-
tures may facilitate attacks against the 
kingdom in the future. This has prevented 
more than 500 potential travelers from 
reaching Syria. At the same time, there are 
concerns that ISIS returnees could perpe-
trate attacks against the kingdom, especially 
after its self-proclaimed Caliph, al-Bagh-
dadi, singled out Morocco as a potential 
target in a speech in summer 2014. Author-
ities have since arrested dozens of radicals 
who pledged allegiance to ISIS and allegedly 
prepared for terrorist attacks against the 
kingdom. This includes, among others, a 
network of 13 persons captured in March 
2015 in different Moroccan cities for alleg-
edly obtaining a large quantity of weapons 
in preparation for attacks against political 
figures and tourist sites. 
Prevention has also been enhanced by 
a new security mechanism called Hadar 
(vigilance), which includes deployment of 
armed elements of the Royal Armed Forces, 
the Royal Gendarmerie, the police, and 
auxiliary forces in main strategic locations 
such as airports, train stations, administra-
tive buildings, tourist areas, etc. Moreover, 
the Moroccan army has for the first time 
deployed heavy weapons near sensitive 
areas along the Algerian border and at air-
ports in order to prevent any possible ter-
rorist attack. At the same time, and despite 
al-Baghdadi’s rhetoric, it remains doubtful 
that Morocco really faces an imminent 
threat from ISIS, given its geographic dis-
tance from the group’s main sites of opera-
tion, its strong security sector, and the chal-
lenges that ISIS has faced recently in Syria 
and Iraq. 
Legal framework 
The second pillar of the authorities’ response 
to the ISIS threat is a host of new anti-terror-
ism laws. In September 2014 the parliament 
adopted a new version of the anti-terrorism 
law of 2003. Proposed by the Ministry of Jus-
tice and Liberties, which is led by the mod-
erate Islamist PJD (Parti de la Justice et du 
Développement), the amendments provided 
for heavy penalties from five to fifteen years 
in prison and fines up to 500,000 Moroccan 
Dirham (ca. €45,000) for any Moroccan who 
joins or tries to join any type of non-state 
armed organization, whether inside or out-
side Morocco. 
The security approach has, however, 
fueled discourses that tend to exaggerate 
and politicize terrorist threats. Voices that 
are critical of the regime, including non-
Islamist organizations – in particular human 
rights organizations such as the Association 
Marocaine des Droits Humains – are strug-
gling with restrictions on the freedom of 
expression. The Ministry of Interior has 
banned numerous activities of the associa-
tion and other human rights NGOs over the 
last year, arguing that the organizations’ 
criticism of the security sector and its prac-
tices were discrediting the “fight against 
terrorism.” 
Conclusion and recommendations 
To turn the current one-dimensional ap-
proach to the phenomenon of Moroccan 
foreign fighters with its focus on security 
into a sustainable long-term strategy, the 
root causes of radicalization have to be 
tackled. This would require a multidimen-
sional approach that operates on the macro 
and micro levels. 
At the macro level, Moroccan authorities 
have done a good job in countering violent 
extremism. Measures such as monitoring 
radical discourses in mosques and programs 
that combat social marginalization such as 
the Initiative Nationale pour le Développe-
ment Humain supplement the security-
based approach. These are strong points on 
the side of Moroccan authorities, and 
Germany and Europe should encourage and 
support them to continue to fight the 
marginalization of youth as a root cause 
of radicalization. 
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The main gap occurs when dealing 
directly with current and former radicals. 
Here, Europeans should work closely with 
Moroccan authorities and local civil society 
organizations to implement a comprehen-
sive micro-level de-radicalization program 
that aims at ideological revision as well as 
social and economic integration. One of the 
examples that can provide valuable insights 
is the Danish experience in designing a pro-
gram that aims to rehabilitate and reinte-
grate foreign fighters. Such a program may 
include, inter alia, the establishment of an 
independent organization that works closely 
with national and local authorities, religious 
organizations, human rights NGOs, ex-de-
tainees, and families of detainees in order 
to facilitate the reintegration of former 
foreign fighters who are ready to reconsider 
their ideological choices. In this context, 
qualified religious scholars should be 
recruited who encourage and mentor pro-
cesses of ideological review. 
There is also a need to engage in the 
social environment of foreign fighters as 
well as Salafi detainees – and, in particular, 
with their families – to contain the spread 
of radicalization and to create a supportive 
environment for those who choose to dis-
tance themselves from radical ideas. More 
specifically, authorities should support the 
families with legal and psychological coun-
sel, and offer support for economic and 
social integration. 
In addition, there is a need for post-
prison programs to reintegrate ex-radicals 
in the legal economy. Hence, Europeans 
should also encourage Moroccan author-
ities to engage with local elected bodies, the 
business community, NGOs, and religious-
based organizations in the implementation 
of the de-radicalization program by provid-
ing jobs, training, and psychological treat-
ment for ex-radicals. 
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